Evolution of in-group favoritism

被引:143
|
作者
Fu, Feng [1 ,4 ]
Tarnita, Corina E. [1 ,5 ,6 ]
Christakis, Nicholas A. [2 ,4 ,7 ]
Wang, Long [3 ]
Rand, David G. [1 ,8 ]
Nowak, Martin A. [1 ,6 ,9 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Med, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[3] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, State Key Lab Turbulence & Complex Syst, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
[4] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Hlth Care Policy, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[5] Harvard Univ, Harvard Soc Fellows, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[6] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[7] Harvard Univ, Dept Sociol, Fac Arts & Sci, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[8] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[9] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2012年 / 2卷
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM; GROUP SELECTION; COOPERATION; INDIVIDUALS; COEVOLUTION; MIGRATION; RULE; KIN;
D O I
10.1038/srep00460
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In-group favoritism is a central aspect of human behavior. People often help members of their own group more than members of other groups. Here we propose a mathematical framework for the evolution of in-group favoritism from a continuum of strategies. Unlike previous models, we do not pre-suppose that players never cooperate with out-group members. Instead, we determine the conditions under which preferential in-group cooperation emerges, and also explore situations where preferential out-group helping could evolve. Our approach is not based on explicit intergroup conflict, but instead uses evolutionary set theory. People can move between sets. Successful sets attract members, and successful strategies gain imitators. Individuals can employ different strategies when interacting with in-group versus out-group members. Our framework also allows us to implement different games for these two types of interactions. We prove general results and derive specific conditions for the evolution of cooperation based on in-group favoritism.
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页数:6
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