Testing for adverse selection of crop insurance in northern China

被引:7
|
作者
Hou, Linging [2 ]
Hoag, Dana L. K. [2 ]
Mu, Yueying [1 ]
机构
[1] China Agr Univ, Dept Econ & Management, Beijing 100094, Peoples R China
[2] Colorado State Univ, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Ft Collins, CO 80523 USA
关键词
China; Crops; Insurance; Crop insurance; Adverse selection; Weather index insurance; WEATHER INDEX INSURANCE; AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE; SCHEME;
D O I
10.1108/17561371111192329
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficiency of current subsidized crop insurance products (SCIPs) in Miyun county, in northern China, by testing the existence of adverse selection. Design/methodology/approach - The authors examine the efficiency of SCIPs from a farmers' point of view by testing the existence of adverse selection using nonparametric tests and logit regression on data from individual interviews in Miyun County. Due to adverse selection, producers with more risk should be more likely to buy crop insurance in pursuit of the benefits from SCIPs. Findings - However, both methods conclude no existence of adverse selection, which indicates that the programs are inefficient. This may not be surprising based on the issues of concern cited above. The opportunities and challenges of a growing interest in weather index insurance are discussed toward the end of the paper. Originality/value - This paper weaves together literature on traditional and weather index insurance, along with primary data from a survey, to examine the pros and cons of each type of insurance. Implications for policy makers are to compare the tradeoffs between concerns of the two types of insurance examined here, traditional and weather index insurance. Ultimately, the political goals might best determine which option is most desirable.
引用
收藏
页码:462 / 475
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Adverse selection in a voluntary rural mutual health care health insurance scheme in China
    Wang, Hong
    Zhang, Licheng
    Yip, Winnie
    Hsiao, William
    [J]. SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE, 2006, 63 (05) : 1236 - 1245
  • [32] Advantageous Selection in Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence
    He, Juan
    Rejesus, Roderick
    Zheng, Xiaoyong
    Yorobe, Jose, Jr.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2018, 69 (03) : 646 - 668
  • [33] Life insurance and breast cancer risk assessment: Adverse selection, genetic testing decisions, and discrimination
    Armstrong, K
    Weber, B
    FitzGerald, G
    Hershey, JC
    Pauly, MV
    Lemaire, J
    Subramanian, K
    Asch, DA
    [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MEDICAL GENETICS PART A, 2003, 120A (03): : 359 - 364
  • [34] Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection
    Picard, Pierre
    [J]. JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, 2020, 87 (04) : 997 - 1033
  • [35] INSURANCE, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND CREAM-SKIMMING
    LEWIS, TR
    SAPPINGTON, DEM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 65 (02) : 327 - 358
  • [36] Ratemaking territories and adverse selection for flood insurance
    Boudreault, Mathieu
    Ojeda, Angelica
    [J]. INSURANCE MATHEMATICS & ECONOMICS, 2022, 107 : 349 - 360
  • [37] Adverse selection in insurance markets: An exaggerated threat
    Siegelman, P
    [J]. YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2004, 113 (06): : 1223 - 1281
  • [38] Evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets
    Dionne, G
    Gouriéroux, C
    Vanasse, C
    [J]. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: ROAD SAFETY, NEW DRIVERS, RISKS, INSURANCE FRAUD AND REGULATION, 1999, : 13 - 46
  • [39] Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
    Neudeck, W
    Podczeck, K
    [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1996, 15 (04) : 387 - 408
  • [40] Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
    Jeleva, M
    Villeneuve, B
    [J]. ECONOMIC THEORY, 2004, 23 (04) : 777 - 794