An exploration of a strategic competition model for the European Union natural gas market

被引：20
|
作者：
Yang, Zaifu [1 ,2 ]
Zhang, Rong [3 ]
Zhang, Zongyi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Chengdu 610074, Peoples R China
[2] Univ York, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
[3] Chongqing Univ, Coll Econ & Business Adm, Chongqing 400030, Peoples R China
来源：
ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 57卷
关键词：
Natural gas market; Cournot model; Stackelberg leader's advantage; Non-profit incentive; Relative market share; European Union; GEOPOLITICS; TRADE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Following Jansen et al. (2012), we examine an unconventional Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers: Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reflect Russia's other strategic consideration besides profit, we incorporate a relative market share into Gazprom's objective function. We prove that when Gazprom pursues the control of market share along with profit, it will be good news for consumers but bad news for its pure profit maximising rivals. We further show that by seeking a proper market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profit of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the standard sequential move leader follower model. Compared with Jansen et al.'s, our approach makes both the analysis considerably simpler and more transparent, and the model more applicable. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：236 / 242
页数：7
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