Detectability-based controller design screening for processes under multiplicative cyberattacks

Cyberattacks on process control systems (PCSs) may target communication links, compromising the data integrity. Cyberattack detection and mitigation are essential capabilities, as the consequences of a successful cyberattack on a PCS may be severe. While detectability may be viewed as a systems-theoretic property, cyberattack detection in practice depends on the attack detection scheme used and the PCS design. This paper presents an approach for control parameter screening based on the detectability of sensor-controller communication link multiplicative attacks. First, a residual set-based condition for the undetectability of an attack is developed. A controller screening methodology aimed at identifying controller parameter choices that mask the detectability of an attack is presented. The proposed methodology can be used to incorporate the detectability of an attack as a criterion into conventional control design criteria (e.g., closed-loop stability and economic considerations). Finally, the application of the controller screening methodology is demonstrated using two illustrative examples.