Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games

被引:0
|
作者
Brown, Noam [1 ]
Sandholm, Tuomas [1 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Comp Sci Dept, Pittsburgh, PA 15217 USA
基金
美国安德鲁·梅隆基金会; 美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole, unlike perfect-information games. Nevertheless, it is possible to first approximate a solution for the whole game and then improve it in individual subgames. This is referred to as subgame solving. We introduce subgame-solving techniques that outperform prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt them, and past subgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the prior state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that subgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the game tree, leading to far lower exploitability. These techniques were a key component of Libratus, the first AI to defeat top humans in heads-up no-limit Texas hold' em poker.
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页数:11
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