Nonprofit cash holdings and spending: The missing role of government funding

被引:4
|
作者
Lee, Shinwoo [1 ]
Woronkowicz, Joanna [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ S Florida, Sch Publ Affairs, 4202 E Fowler Ave, Tampa, FL 33620 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Sch Publ & Environm Affairs, Bloomington, IN USA
来源
NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP | 2019年 / 29卷 / 03期
关键词
agency problems; government funding; nonprofit cash holdings; AGENCY PROBLEMS; ORGANIZATIONS; COMPENSATION; ENDOWMENT; DETERMINANTS; FINANCE;
D O I
10.1002/nml.21342
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Charitable nonprofit organizations have long been under scrutiny with regard to how they manage excess funds, particularly cash holdings. Given previous empirical evidence, agency problems have been treated as an effective lens to explain the consequences of cash holdings among nonprofits. That is, nonprofit managers spend cash holdings for their own interests as opposed to the social interests of the organization. This study revisits the question of how charities manage extra cash and further examines the role of government funding in nonprofits' spending decisions. The results suggest that nonprofit managers make decisions on how to manage extra cash in accordance with the level of cash holdings; therefore, agency problems do not effectively explain how nonprofits manage extra cash. Furthermore, the results illustrate two contrasting roles of government funding in nonprofits' financial behavior: government funding may be used to monitor unscrupulous behaviors among managers, but it may also restrain nonprofits from investing in human capital.
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页码:321 / 340
页数:20
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