Shareholder Perks and Firm Value

被引:8
|
作者
Karpoff, Jonathan M. [1 ]
Schonlau, Robert [2 ]
Suzuki, Katsushi [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[2] Colorado State Univ, Coll Business, Ft Collins, CO 80523 USA
[3] Hitotsubashi Univ, Sch Business Adm, Tokyo, Japan
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2021年 / 34卷 / 12期
关键词
INVESTOR RECOGNITION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PROPENSITY SCORE; MARKET-SEGMENTATION; DIVIDEND CHANGES; STOCK LIQUIDITY; CROSS-SECTION; ASSET PRICES; RISK-TAKING; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhaa141
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm's products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.
引用
收藏
页码:5676 / 5722
页数:47
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