Foreign buyout of international equity joint ventures in China: When does performance improve?

被引:6
|
作者
Duanmu, Jing-Lin [1 ]
Lawton, Thomas [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Exeter, Exeter Business Sch, Colchester EP4 4QJ, Essex, England
[2] Cork Univ, Sch Business, Univ Coll Cork, Cork T12 K8AF, Ireland
[3] Univ Surrey, Sch Business, Surrey GU2 7XH, England
关键词
International equity joint venture; Foreign buyout; Firm performance; CEO succession; Agency theory; Incomplete contract theory; Efficiency-seeking FDI; China; TRANSACTION COSTS THEORY; TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; MULTINATIONAL-CORPORATIONS; BARGAINING POWER; FIRM PERFORMANCE; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; UNITED-STATES; ENTRY MODE; GLOBAL STRATEGY; AGENCY PROBLEMS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jwb.2021.101243
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Since the early 2000s, Sino-foreign equity joint ventures (JVs) have declined sharply as a predominant strategy for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter and operate in China. We study one of the contributory factors, foreign buyout, and its performance implications. By applying incomplete contract theory and an agency perspective, we provide micro evidence that superior post buyout performance is observed in converted whollyowned subsidiaries (WOSs) with efficiency-seeking operations and subsequent CEO succession. The findings extend our understanding that ownership per se does not guarantee performance improvement. Instead, it is the alignment between ownership and the owner's inputs, and between ownership and the owner's managerial control, that give rise to performance improvement.
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页数:13
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