Coordination of fresh agricultural product supply chain with dual channels under price and fresh-keeping effort dependent demand

This electronic document is a "live" template and already defines the components of your paper [title, text, heads, etc.] in its style sheet. The pricing and fresh-keeping strategy is studied in the fresh agricultural product supply chain(FAPSC) composed of one supplier and one retailer. The retailer is in charge of selling the fresh agricultural products(FAP) through both online and offline channels. The supplier is in charge of producing FAP. The demand is affected by the retail price charged by the retailer and the fresh-keeping effort taken by the supplier. The optimal decisions of the centralized and decentralized FAPSC are analyzed and compared. The results show that the centralized FAPSC takes a higher fresh keeping effort and gains more profit. The revenue-sharing(RS) contract and revenue and fresh-keeping cost-sharing(RFCS) contract are proposed to coordinate the decentralized FAPSC. A numerical example are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the contracts. The results show that both contracts can increase the profit of the decentralized FAPSC, while the RFCS contract can ensure that the decentralized FAPSC perform as the centrailzed one.