Firms' Beliefs and Learning: Models, Identification, and Empirical Evidence

被引:10
|
作者
Aguirregabiria, Victor [1 ]
Jeon, Jihye [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, CEPR, 150 St. George Street., Toronto, ON M5S 3G7, Canada
[2] Boston Univ, 270 Bay State Rd, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
Dynamics; Identification; Learning; Non-equilibrium beliefs; Oligopoly competition; Structural models; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; STRUCTURAL MODELS; GAMES; CONVERGENCE; EQUILIBRIUM; DYNAMICS; AUCTIONS; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1007/s11151-019-09722-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper reviews recent literature on structural models of oligopoly competition where firms have biased beliefs about the primitives of the model-e.g. demand, costs-or about the strategic behavior of other firms in the market. We describe different structural models that have been proposed to study this phenomenon and examine the approaches that have been used to identify firms' beliefs. We discuss empirical results in recent studies and show that accounting for firms' biased beliefs and learning can have important implications on our measures and interpretation of market efficiency.
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页码:203 / 235
页数:33
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