The third party governance model analysis in industrial cluster based on evolvement game

被引:0
|
作者
Liu Qin [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Shanghai 200093, Peoples R China
关键词
evolvement game; industrial cluster; evolvement stable strategy (ESS);
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The industrial cluster shows it particular advantages to the world, and at the same time some members will have opportunism bargaining and competition behavior. These opportunism behaviors have affect the sustainable development of cluster. So the industrial cluster should be governed. The ways may be self-organization governance and the third party governance. The paper uses the evolvement game to study that under the third party governance the different groups with different strategies may evolve to different situation. And it also analyzes the factors affected the evolvement. The paper constructs the payment matrix and the replication dynamic equation of game under common condition and third party governance. According to the payment matrix, it gets the different evolvement stable strategy. Then the paper use numerical value simulation to examine the results. Last, it raises some governance policy measures.
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页码:1304 / 1309
页数:6
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