Can anti-corruption improve the quality of environmental information disclosure?

被引:14
|
作者
Wei, Ye [1 ]
He, Wenjian [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Business Sch, Nanjing 210044, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Dev Inst Jiangbei New Area, Nanjing 210044, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Anti-corruption; Environmental information disclosure; Difference-in-difference model; ECONOMIC-PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CO2; EMISSIONS; RESPONSIBILITY; DETERMINANTS; DIFFERENCE; GOVERNMENT; INCOME; LEVEL;
D O I
10.1007/s11356-021-15932-w
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study takes the anti-corruption campaign of the 18th CPC National Congress in China as an exogenous impact build a double difference (DID) model, proving that anti-corruption can increase the quality of enterprise environmental information disclosure significantly. After a series of tests such as parallel trend test and placebo test, the results are still robust. The intermediary effect model results indicate that the anti-corruption increases the violation cost of enterprises and encourages enterprises to carry out innovation activities, and ultimately increase the quality of enterprise environmental information disclosure. Heterogeneity analysis finds that non-state-owned enterprises, large enterprises, and regions with more substantial environmental supervision will improve the quality of enterprise environmental information disclosure to a greater extent. The findings of this paper can help provide policy inspiration for improving the mandatory environmental information disclosure system and strengthening the enforcement of environmental regulations.
引用
收藏
页码:5345 / 5359
页数:15
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