Forest-owner support for their cooperative's provision of public goods

被引:3
|
作者
Nilsson, Jerker [1 ]
Helgesson, Matilda [1 ]
Rommel, Jens [1 ]
Svensson, Ellinor [1 ]
机构
[1] Swedish Univ Agr Sci, Dept Econ, Uppsala, Sweden
关键词
Sodra; Sweden; Lobbying; Competitive yardstick model; Property rights; Ownership; AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES; PROSPECT-THEORY; SOCIAL VALUES; GOVERNANCE; MEMBERS; PARTICIPATION; INVOLVEMENT; COMMITMENT; SERVICES; DECISION;
D O I
10.1016/j.forpol.2020.102156
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study investigates why members support their forestry cooperative's provision of awareness-raising campaigns. The members pay for the cooperative's dissemination of information to the government, non-governmental organizations, and the public to achieve a more favorable opinion about forestry. The possible gains of the campaign are non-rivalry goods and apply to members and non-members alike, which makes the campaign a public good. A sample of 782 members of a Swedish forestry cooperative completed a questionnaire based on four theoretically motivated hypotheses. The findings indicate that members are unconcerned about nonmember benefits from campaigns. Members particularly appreciate raising awareness of production-related issues. Social influences among the population of forest owners have no major impact. Trust in the cooperative is essential for member support of the provision of public goods. Members support the cooperative's campaigns even if the outcomes are uncertain or occur in a distant future.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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