Auctions with endogenous entry

被引：7
|
作者：
Chakraborty, I [1 ]
Kosmopoulou, G [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Oklahoma, Dept Econ, Norman, OK 73019 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 72卷 / 02期
关键词：
auctions; entry;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00429-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Predictions from auction models with endogenous bidder participation depend on whether entry takes place under asymmetric information or not. Auctions that are not revenue equivalent in the former set up may be so in the latter. Moreover, under asymmetric information the social planner does not discourage entry even when the bid preparation cost is large. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BN. All rights reserved.
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页码：195 / 200
页数：6
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