Managerial ownership, corporate governance and firms' exporting decisions: evidence from Chinese listed companies

被引:19
|
作者
Dixon, Robert [1 ]
Guariglia, Alessandra [2 ]
Vijayakumaran, Ratnam [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Durham, Business Sch, Durham, England
[2] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham, W Midlands, England
[3] Univ Jaffna, Dept Finance, Jaffna, Sri Lanka
来源
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2017年 / 23卷 / 7-9期
关键词
managerial ownership; corporate governance; export propensity; export intensity; firm heterogeneity; China; CEO COMPENSATION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCING CONSTRAINTS; ENTERPRISE REFORM; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION; PRIVATIZED FIRMS; RISK REDUCTION;
D O I
10.1080/1351847X.2015.1025990
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using a large panel of Chinese listed companies over the period 2004-2010, we document that both export propensity and intensity increase with managerial ownership up to a point of around 23-27% and decrease thereafter. In addition, we find a negative association between state ownership and export intensity. Finally, we observe that the larger their board of directors, the lower firms' export propensity and intensity, and that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors in the board are generally less likely to export. These findings are mainly driven by privately controlled firms during the post-2006 period.
引用
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页码:802 / 840
页数:39
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