Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games

被引：3
|
作者：
Hasker, Kevin [1 ]
机构：
[1] Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, TR-06800 Ankara, Turkey
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2007年 / 36卷 / 01期
关键词：
repeated games; matching games; social norms; folk theorem; C72; C78; C79;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-007-0078-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A folk theorem which holds for all repeated matching games is established. The folk theorem holds any time the stage game payoffs of any two players are not affinely equivalent. The result is independent of population size and matching rule-including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play.
引用
收藏
页码：137 / 146
页数：10
相关论文
共 50 条
12345