CEO overconfidence and the adjustment speed of leverage and cash: evidence on cash is not the same as negative debt

被引:1
|
作者
Yung, Kenneth [1 ]
Long, Xiang [2 ]
机构
[1] Old Dominion Univ, Strome Coll Business, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA
[2] Hollins Univ, Roanoke, VA 24020 USA
关键词
Target leverage; Target cash; Adjustment speed; CEO overconfidence; Cash and debt substitutability; Cash is not the same as negative debt; CAPITAL STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENT; CORPORATE LIQUIDITY; MANAGERIAL TRAITS; DETERMINANTS; FINANCE; HUBRIS; COSTS;
D O I
10.1007/s00181-021-02158-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) adjusting firm leverage if it is above (below) target leverage. In addition, overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) adjusting firm cash holdings if it is below (above) the optimal balance. Our results imply overconfident CEOs are associated with high cash holdings and low leverage. Additional tests suggest that the results do not imply cash and (negative) debt are substitutable. We also find overconfident CEOs sometimes reduce firm leverage unexpectedly. The observation is consistent with the view that overconfident CEOs are strong-willed individuals who dislike being monitored. Thus, besides the tendency to overestimate their ability and underestimate risk, overconfident CEOs are affected by additional aspects of their behavioral traits in decision making.
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页码:1081 / 1108
页数:28
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