Matching with aggregate externalities

被引：15
|
作者：
Fisher, James C. D. [1 ]
Hafalir, Isa E. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Technol Sydney, Econ Discipline Grp, POB 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2016年 / 81卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
STABLE MATCHINGS; STABILITY; PREFERENCES; COLLEAGUES; MARRIAGE; MARKETS; COUPLES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change very much in response to changes in two individuals' actions. Thus, individuals rationally regard the level of the externality as fixed in their negotiations with each other. We leverage this observation to develop a general framework for the existence of stable matchings in moderately sized one-to-one matching games, and we characterize intuitive restrictions on preferences that are sufficient for existence (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码：1 / 7
页数：7
相关论文
共 50 条
12345