Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental Study

被引：11
|
作者：
Camacho-Cuena, Eva [2 ]
Requate, Till [3 ,4 ]
Waichman, Israel [1 ]
机构：
[1] Heidelberg Univ, Dept Econ, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany
[2] Univ Jaume I Castellon, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
[3] Univ Kiel, Dept Econ, D-24118 Kiel, Germany
[4] Kiel Inst World Econ, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
来源：
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 53卷 / 02期
关键词：
Environmental policy; Abatement technology; Taxes; Permit trading; Auctions; POLLUTION-ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY; POLICY INSTRUMENTS; INNOVATION; MARKETS; ADOPT; AUCTIONS; PERMITS;
D O I：
10.1007/s10640-012-9560-8
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits. We consider three allocation/auction policies: auctioning off (costly) permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits with re-allocation through a single-unit double auction, and grandfathering with re-allocation through an ascending clock auction. Our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering. We nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment, it affects the static efficiency from permit trading.
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页码：229 / 249
页数：21
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