Vertical integration, innovation and foreclosure with competing ecosystems

被引:2
|
作者
Bisceglia, Michele [1 ,2 ]
Padilla, Jorge [3 ]
Piccolo, Salvatore [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Shekhar, Shiva [3 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy
[3] Compass Lexecon, Washington, DC 20004 USA
[4] CSEF, Naples, Italy
[5] Univ Passau, Passau, Germany
关键词
Competing ecosystems; Foreclosure; Innovation; Vertical mergers; PRICE; CONTRACTS; MANUFACTURERS; INFERENCE; RETAILERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100981
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the competitive effects of a vertical merger in a digital industry where an integrated incumbent (closed ecosystem) competes with an open ecosystem formed by an upstream supplier (ecosystem gatekeeper) and two downstream retailers selling differentiated products. Absent innovation, the incumbent sells a superior product compared to the rivals' ones. Yet, the gatekeeper of the open ecosystem can fill up this gap by engaging in product innovation. We investigate the impact of vertical integration on the gatekeeper's incentives to foreclose its non-integrated downstream unit and innovate its ecosystem to compete head-to-head with the incumbent. The vertically integrated gatekeeper raises the costs of the unintegrated competitor to relax intra-ecosystem competition but does not fully foreclose it as that would cause fiercer inter-ecosystem competition. Moreover, vertical integration enhances innovation within the open ecosystem, enabling its participants to catch up with the incumbent. Overall, vertical integration may benefit consumers even when it softens intra-ecosystem competition. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure in the Korean Cable Television Industry: An Empirical Study
    Lee, Sang-Woo
    Kim, Changwan
    JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 2011, 55 (01) : 54 - 71
  • [32] Innovation and vertical integration in complementary markets
    Heeb, R
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 2003, 12 (03) : 387 - 417
  • [33] Vertical Integration Smooths Innovation Diffusion
    Filippini, Luigi
    Vergari, Cecilia
    B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY, 2017, 17 (03):
  • [34] THE FORECLOSURE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS
    BOLTON, P
    WHINSTON, MD
    JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 1991, 147 (01): : 207 - 226
  • [35] EQUILIBRIUM VERTICAL FORECLOSURE - REPLY
    ORDOVER, JA
    SALONER, G
    SALOP, SC
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1992, 82 (03): : 698 - 703
  • [36] Option contracts and vertical foreclosure
    Ma, CA
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 1997, 6 (04) : 725 - 753
  • [37] Vertical mergers without foreclosure
    Kadner-Graziano, Alessandro S.
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 2024,
  • [38] VERTICAL MERGERS AND MARKET FORECLOSURE
    SALINGER, MA
    QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 103 (02): : 345 - 356
  • [39] Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets
    Martin, S
    Normann, HT
    Snyder, CM
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 32 (03): : 466 - 496
  • [40] EQUILIBRIUM VERTICAL FORECLOSURE - COMMENT
    REIFFEN, D
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1992, 82 (03): : 694 - 697