Bargaining theory over opportunity assignments and the egalitarian solution

被引：1
|
作者：
Xu, Yongsheng [1 ]
Yoshihara, Naoki [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[2] Univ Massachusetts Amherst, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA USA
[3] Hitotsubashi Univ, Inst Econ Res, Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan
[4] Kochi Univ Technol, Sch Management, Kochi, Japan
来源：
METROECONOMICA | 2022年 / 73卷 / 01期
关键词：
bargaining over opportunity assignments; egalitarian solution; opportunity sets; EQUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES; SETS;
D O I：
10.1111/meca.12359
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and the egalitarian solution to standard bargaining problems is reformulated and axiomatically characterized.
引用
收藏
页码：198 / 219
页数：22
相关论文
共 50 条
12345