Thinking about representations: The case of opaque contexts

被引:17
|
作者
Kamawar, Deepthi [1 ,2 ]
Olson, David R. [3 ]
机构
[1] Carleton Univ, Inst Cognit Sci, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B7, Canada
[2] Carleton Univ, Dept Psychol, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B7, Canada
[3] Univ Toronto, OISE, Toronto, ON M5S 1V6, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Opaque contexts; Referential opacity; Theory of mind; Representation; Metarepresentation; False belief; LANGUAGE; MIND; CHILDREN; OPACITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jecp.2010.10.005
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children's performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb "know") and poorest for intentional opacity (using "mean to"), with quotational opacity (using "said") falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children's sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:734 / 746
页数:13
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