Using disaster-induced closures to evaluate discrete choice models of hospital demand

被引:4
|
作者
Raval, Devesh [1 ]
Rosenbaum, Ted [1 ]
Wilson, Nathan E. [2 ]
机构
[1] Fed Trade Commiss, Washington, DC 20580 USA
[2] Compass Lexecon, Washington, DC USA
来源
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 53卷 / 03期
关键词
antitrust; diversion ratio; hospitals; natural experiment; patient choice; PROVIDER NETWORKS; COMPETITION; PRICES; COSTS;
D O I
10.1111/1756-2171.12421
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Although diversion ratios are important inputs to merger evaluation, there is little evidence about how accurately discrete choice models predict diversions. Using a series of natural disasters that unexpectedly closed hospitals, we compare observed post-disaster diversion ratios to those predicted from pre-disaster data using standard models of hospital demand. We find that all standard models consistently underpredict large diversions. Both unobserved heterogeneity in preferences over travel and post-disaster changes to physician practice patterns can explain some of the underprediction of large diversions. We find a significant improvement using models with a random coefficient on distance.
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页码:561 / 589
页数:29
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