The Psychology of Overt and Covert Intervention

Overt interventions to forcibly promote regimes abroad are often a risky undertaking. If successful, they can replace or rescue regimes and signal resolve in the process. But open meddling can also trigger large-scale escalation, incite nationalist backlash, and harm a state's reputation. Despite an emerging consensus that states often prefer covert action to avoid these liabilities, leaders sometimes opt for overt action anyway. Why? Drawing on the concept of loss aversion, this article argues that leaders' tolerance for risk differs depending on whether the goal is to overthrow a foreign regime or prop one up. Because regime rescue approximates loss prevention, leaders are more likely to pursue risky intervention strategies than they are to change regimes, a prospective gain. This framework helps explain why leaders are more likely to accept the risks of overt action when saving a foreign regime and more likely to go covert when deposing one. I evaluate this theory using the Eisenhower administration's covert regime change efforts in Syria (1956-57) and overt regime rescue attempts in Lebanon (1958).