Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

被引：131
|
作者：
Hadani, Michael [1 ]
Goranova, Maria [2 ]
Khan, Raihan [3 ]
机构：
[1] Long Isl Univ, Coll Management, Brookville, NY 11548 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin Milwaukee, Sheldon B Lubar Sch Business, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
[3] SUNY Coll Oswego, Sch Business, Oswego, NY 13126 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2011年 / 64卷 / 12期
关键词：
Shareholder activism; Largest institutional owner; Earnings management; Agency theory; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CEO COMPENSATION; FUND ACTIVISM; BOARD; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY; MONITORS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The widespread practice of earnings management adversely impacts the quality of financial reports and increases information asymmetries between owners and managers. The present study investigates the effect of shareholder activism (as expressed by the proxy proposals sponsored by shareholders), and monitoring by the largest institutional owner on earnings management. Our longitudinal analyses indicate that the number of shareholder proposals received by firms is positively related to subsequent earnings management, yet concurrently, monitoring by the largest institutional owners is negatively related to earnings management. Our findings shed light on the equivocal results reported by prior research regarding the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, on one hand, and ownership monitoring and performance, on the other. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：1352 / 1360
页数：9
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