The natural rightness of names in Plato's "Cratylus"

A new approaches to the study of Plato's dialogues, mainly so called dramatic interpretation connected with the names such as Kenneth Sayre, Gerald Press etc., has been the main inspiration for writing these remarks about language. The subject here is mostly the dialogue Cratylus which deals with the relation between the natural rightness of names and the role of conventions in the language. The justifications are collected to support Robert Robinson's conjencture, that "writing Cratylus may have been a sort of purgation of the nature-theory from Plato's mind". There are collected some justifications (Xenophon, Prodicus) that the nature-theory of names was broadly discussed among peoples in Plato's days. It is also very probable that this type of thinking was imported from Persia (Zoroaster) and China (Confucius - the amendment of names). The idea of the immediate connection of names with the named things originated in the mythical way of thinking leading to magic. Cassirer sees the origin of the mythical thinking in the weakness of reason that it misinterprets the main principles our language is grounded in. Next remarks are concerned with the concept of the convention and that of the rightness. Let the names in the language be right naturaly or let they be given by random way, in both cases they are conventions, as soon as their usage is the matter of the agreement followed by the habit. Owing to the prevailing conventions there can be specified the rightness of language, namely its keeping up the language standards. (It is the current notion of the rightness of the language prefared among linguists.) There is still possible another way of viewing the rightness. Let we allow that the natural rightness of names is not only the matter of the magic connection between the name and the thing, but that there are according to the Peirce, de Saussure, and Roman Jakobson more or less complex structures in the language, filling it with rules and undertaking it to the objective order (logos). The typical example of that sort are logical forms. If they are accepted to be conventions, it is possible to specify their rightness.