COMPUTING POWER INDICES FOR WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES VIA DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

被引:6
|
作者
Staudacher, Jochen [1 ]
Koczy, Laszlo A. [2 ,3 ]
Stach, Izabella [4 ]
Filipp, Jan [1 ]
Kramer, Marcus [1 ]
Noffke, Till [1 ]
Olsson, Linus [1 ]
Pichler, Jonas [1 ]
Singer, Tobias [1 ]
机构
[1] Hsch Kempten, Fak Informat, Bahnhofstr 61, D-87435 Kempten, Germany
[2] Ctr Econ & Reg Studies, Inst Econ, Toth Kalman U 4, H-1097 Budapest, Hungary
[3] Budapest Univ Technol & Econ, Dept Finance, Magyar Tudosok Korutja 2, H-1112 Budapest, Hungary
[4] AGH Univ Sci & Technol, Al Mickiewicza 30, PL-30059 Krakow, Poland
关键词
cooperative game theory; power indices; weighted voting games; dynamic programming; minimal winning coalitions;
D O I
10.37190/ord210206
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
引用
收藏
页码:123 / 145
页数:23
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