Selling Data at an Auction under Privacy Constraints

被引:0
|
作者
Zhang, Mengxiao [1 ]
Beltran, Fernando [1 ]
Liu, Jiamou [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Auckland, Business Sch, Auckland, New Zealand
[2] Univ Auckland, Sch Comp Sci, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Private data query combines mechanism design with privacy protection to produce aggregated statistics from privately-owned data records. The problem arises in a data marketplace where data owners have personalised privacy requirements and private data valuations. We focus on the case when the data owners are single-minded, i.e., they are willing to release their data only if the data broker guarantees to meet their announced privacy requirements. For a data broker who wants to purchase data from such data owners, we propose the Single-MindedQuery (SMQ) mechanism, which uses a reverse auction to select data owners and determine compensations. SMQ satisfies interim incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. Moreover, it uses purchased privacy expectation maximisation as a principle to produce accurate outputs for commonly-used queries such as counting, median and linear predictor. The effectiveness of our method is empirically validated by a series of experiments.
引用
收藏
页码:669 / 678
页数:10
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