Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games

被引：3

作者：

Calleja, Pedro ^{[1
]}

Llerena, Francesc ^{[2
]}

Sudholter, Peter ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Barcelona BEAT, Dept Matemat Econom Financera & Actuarial, Av Diagonal 690, Barcelona 08034, Spain

[2] Univ Rovira & Virgili ECO SOS, Dept Gestio Empreses, Av Univ 1, Reus 43204, Spain

[3] Univ Southern Denmark, Dept Business & Econ, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 95卷

关键词：

Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution; Axiomatizations; Aggregate monotonicity; Convex TU game; MODIFIED NUCLEOLUS; MONOTONICITY; KERNEL; CORE; SET;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest "by "poorer "allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency a la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency a la Hart and Mas-Colell.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：10