What Makes a Reasoning Sound? C. S. Peirce's Normative Foundation of Logic

The immediate purpose of this paper is to expound C. S. Peirce's conception of reasoning as he refined it in his mature reflection on the normative sciences and their hierarchical relations (the dependence of logic on ethics and, in turn, that of ethics on esthetics). In order to clarify adequately Peirce's position, however, it is helpful to consider his rejection of Christoph Sigwart's attempt to ground logical soundness in subjective feeling. What is at stake in this debate is nothing less than Peirce's endeavor to articulate a thoroughly pragmatic understanding of truth, not simply his commitment to argue against subjective approaches to logical questions. Accordingly, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to shed light on the problem of objectivity. From a pragmatist perspective, there is an essential relation between an affectively involved agent and a deliberately conducted, successful inquiry. This alone secures the possibility of objectivity in the only form in which finite, fallible agents can hope to attain or, at least, approximate this ideal.