Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams

被引：14
|
作者：
Gershkov, Alex [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Winter, Eyal [1 ,2 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Econ, Ctr Study Rat, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Study Rat, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[3] Univ Surrey, Sch Econ, Guildford GU2 5XH, Surrey, England
[4] Univ Leicester, Dept Econ, Leicester LE1 7RH, Leics, England
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2015年 / 7卷 / 02期
基金：
以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
TRANSPARENCY; PARTNERSHIPS; EFFICIENCY; INCENTIVES; AGENTS;
D O I：
10.1257/mic.20130277
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution.
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页码：27 / 44
页数：18
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