The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms

被引:592
|
作者
Chaney, Paul K. [2 ]
Faccio, Mara [1 ]
Parsley, David [2 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Owen Grad Sch Management, Nashville, TN USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 51卷 / 1-2期
关键词
Quality of information; Accruals quality; Political ties; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP; ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP; CASH FLOWS; ACCRUALS; PERFORMANCE; EQUITY; COSTS; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.07.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:58 / 76
页数:19
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