Do Informal Contracts Matter for Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Social Capital

被引:23
|
作者
Gupta, Atul [1 ]
Raman, Kartik [1 ]
Shang, Chenguang [2 ]
机构
[1] Bentley Univ, Waltham, MA 02452 USA
[2] Texas State Univ, McCoy Coll Business, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA
关键词
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; FIRING COSTS; LABOR UNIONS; LAWS;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109019000498
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation.
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收藏
页码:1657 / 1684
页数:28
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