Does informal governance matter to institutional investors? Evidence from social capital

被引:1
|
作者
Huang, Kershen [1 ]
Shang, Chenguang [2 ]
机构
[1] Nova Southeastern Univ, Huizenga Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, 3300 S Univ Dr, Ft Lauderdale, FL 33328 USA
[2] Suffolk Univ, Sawyer Business Sch, Boston, MA USA
关键词
agency costs; institutional investors; monitoring; social capital; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; CROSS-SECTION; TRUST; EARNINGS; OWNERSHIP; RESPONSIBILITY; PREFERENCES; RETURNS; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1111/fire.12373
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find a positive association between institutional ownership and social capital. The social norms in a region, while not imposed by businesses or laws, play a monitoring role that disciplines managers from self-serving behaviors. The resulting trustworthiness, through its mitigation of agency problems, drives the investment preferences of institutions. Our subsample analyses based on information asymmetry and financial performance support this inference. Further, the positive association is evident for transient investors and quasi-indexers but not for dedicated institutional investors. Overall, our study underscores the impact of informal governance on institutions' investment decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:433 / 457
页数:25
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