Based on a study on the theory of political representation, this article seeks to question the supposed ontological link between representation, election and democracy that supports the idea of electoral representative democracy. In the course of this analysis, it will be demonstrated that the so-called representative system is based on a semantic imprecision that confuses the correct understanding of its nature, since, when created, at the end of the 18th century, political representation was thought against the democratic idea and in a negation of a true representation. Indeed, when examining the theoretical foundations of the representative system, we will see that, based on the concept of national sovereignty, the representative quality of an organ does not derive from its way of designation but from the nature of the power exercised by it, as Pierre Brunet explains. Thus, it can be confirmed that representation, in public law, is not procedural but functional, while the election is only a simple process of selecting rulers which does not in any way create any type of representation. Hence, the theory of the State organ will be presented as being more appropriate to explain the logic of the representative system. Finally, we conclude this research by emphasizing the fact that, while essential features of political representation still remain in force today, the universalization of suffrage and the strengthening of popular participation have helped to change the nature of the modern representative system, which, as Bernard Manin says, could be defined as mixed.