The cooperation-defection evolution on social networks

被引:0
|
作者
Sarkar, Bijan [1 ]
机构
[1] Neotia Inst Technol Management & Sci, Dept Math, Diamond Harbour Rd, Kolkata 743368, W Bengal, India
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Analytical procedure; Algorithm method; Cooperation enhancement; Defection hindrance; GAME DYNAMICS; POPULATION; FERTILITY; EMERGENCE; SELECTION; PROMOTES;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2021.126381
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Without contributing, defectors take more benefit from social resources than cooperators which is the reflection of a specific character of individuals. However, natural physical mechanisms of our society promote cooperation. Thus, in the long run, the evolution about genetic variation is something more than the social evolution about fitness. The loci of evolutionary paths of the cooperation and the defection are correlated, but not a full complement of each other. Yet, the only single specific mechanism which is operated by some rules explains the enhancement of cooperation where the independent analysis of defect evolutionary mechanism is ignored. Moreover, the execution of a particular evolutionary rule through algorithm method over the long time encounters highly sensitive influence of the model parameters. Theoretically, biodiversity of two types relatively persists rarely. Here I describe the evolutionary outcome in the demographic fluctuation. Using both analytical procedure and algorithm method the article concludes that the intratype fitness of individual species is the key factor for not only surviving, but thriving. In consideration of the random drift, the experimental outcomes show that dominant enhancement of cooperation over defection is qualitatively independent of environmental scenario. Collectively, the set of the rules becomes an evolutionary principle to cooperation enhancement. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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