Distinguishing topological and causal explanation

Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of explanation. In this literature, topological explanation is viewed as a clear example of the non-causal variety-it is claimed that topology lacks temporal information, which is necessary for causal structure (Pincock in Mathematics and scientic representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Huneman in Synthese 177:213-245, 2010). This paper explores the distinction between topological and causal forms of explanation and argues that this distinction is not as clear cut as the literature suggests. One reason for this is that some explanations involve both topological and causal information. In these "borderline" cases scientists explain some outcome by appealing to the causal topology of the system of interest. These cases help clarify a type of topological explanation that is genuinely causal, but that differs from standard topological and interventionist accounts of explanation (Woodward in Making things happen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).