Existing neopositivist approaches to causal explanation focus their time and effort on the evaluation of nomothetic causal claims, and spend very little energy on the question of how, precisely, a nomothetic generalization explains a particular observed outcome. Against this approach I develop a more pragmatic analysis of the act of explanation in order to flesh out the context of causal explanation more broadly. Causal explanation, I argue, responds to a problem-situation in which the challenge involves how to do something, and unfolds by clarifying why and how some outcome rather than some other outcome came about - thus giving instructions on how to make the desired outcome happen. The resulting account of causal explanation encompasses a wide variety of explanatory strategies including the appeal to causal mechanisms, dispositional properties, everyday experiences, and even nomothetic generalisations; as such, it provides a better and broader basis for thinking about causal explanation in international studies than the restrictive neopositivist models presently on offer.