On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice

Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naive "public interest" explanations for competition policy's origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world-showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large-most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such.