Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies: a limit theorem

被引:12
|
作者
Lahmandi-Ayed, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech Tunisie, La Marsa 2078, Tunisia
关键词
strategic behaviour; oligopoly equilibrium; replication; convergence; competitive equilibrium;
D O I
10.1007/PL00004122
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a pure exchange economy, agents have the possibility of behaving strategically by putting only a part of their initial endowments on the market. An oligopoly equilibrium is defined to be a Nash equilibrium of the game in which agents choose simultaneously quantities to be put on the market. It is proved that under standard hypotheses, the oligopoly equilibrium leads to the competitive equilibrium when the economy is replicated an infinite number of times.
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页码:665 / 674
页数:10
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