Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments

被引：6
|
作者：
Leufkens, Kasper [1 ]
Peeters, Ronald [1 ]
机构：
[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2011年 / 29卷 / 01期
关键词：
Short-run price commitments; Alternating-move games; Collusion; Price dynamics; Experiment; DUOPOLY; MARKETS; COOPERATION; COMPETITION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a dynamic homogeneous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments increase profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conducted provide support for the first effect and against the second effect when a random ending rule is applied. When a fixed ending rule is applied, we find no significant impact of short-run price commitments on profits and price stability. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：134 / 153
页数：20
相关论文
共 50 条
12345