Tripoly Stackelberg game model: One leader versus two followers

被引:44
|
作者
Askar, S. S. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] King Saud Univ, Coll Sci, Dept Stat & Operat Res, POB 2455, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia
[2] Mansoura Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Mansoura 35516, Egypt
关键词
Bounded rationality; Stackelberg game; Stability; Bifurcation; Chaos; Control; NONLINEAR DUOPOLY GAME; HETEROGENEOUS PLAYERS; COURNOT DUOPOLY; CHAOS CONTROL; DYNAMICS; COOPERATION; BIFURCATION; FEEDBACK;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2018.01.041
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
This paper is devoted to introduce and study a Stackelberg game consisting of three competed firms. The three firms are classified as a leader which is the first firm and the other two firms are called the followers. A linear inverse demand function is used. In addition a quadratic cost based on an actual and announced quantities is adopted. Based on bounded rationality, a three-dimensional discrete dynamical system is constructed. For the system, the backward induction is used to solve the system and to get Nash equilibrium. The obtained results are shown that Nash equilibrium is unique and its stability is affected by the system's parameters by which the system behaves chaotically due to bifurcation and chaos appeared. Some numerical experiments are performed to portrays such chaotic behavior. A control scheme is used to return the system back to its stability state and is supported by some simulations. (c) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 311
页数:11
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