Attack-Resilient Distributed Control in DC Microgrids

This paper develops a resilient distributed control mechanism that ensures voltage regulation and proportional current sharing in DC microgrids while under unknown cyberattacks. The attackers are assumed to inject false data to the actuators of microgrid control systems. The proposed resilient control algorithm steers the DC microgrid as close as possible to the desired equilibrium regardless of the potential unknown attacks and guarantees average voltage regulation and proportional current sharing in DC microgrids. The proposed resilient control design does not require any knowledge on the nature or the locations of cyber-attacks. By virtue of a graph theoretical approach and a Lyapunov-based framework, it is shown that the proposed resilient control strategy guarantees the stability of DC microgrids. The efficiency and resilience of the proposed distributed control approach is demonstrated via simulation scenarios on a DC microgrid consisting of eight distributed generation units while under attack.