Competitive cheap talk

被引:17
|
作者
Li, Zhuozheng [1 ]
Rantakari, Heikki [3 ]
Yang, Huanxing [2 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, 410 Arps Hall,1945 N High St, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Univ Rochester, Simon Business Sch, 305 Schlegel Hall, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
Cheap talk; Multiple senders; Competition; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ELICITING INFORMATION; LEGISLATIVE RULES; COMMUNICATION; AUTHORITY; SENDERS; EXPERTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study a competitive cheap talk model with two senders. Each sender is responsible for a single project and observes its return. Exactly one project will be implemented. Both senders share some common interests with the principal, but have own-project biases. Under simultaneous communication, all equilibria are shown to be partition equilibria, but all the equilibria can no longer be ranked ex ante in terms of Pareto efficiency. The payoff of the principal depends on both the total conflict between the agents and the asymmetry in the own-project biases. In the equilibrium preferred by the principal, the agent with a smaller bias always has veto power to determine which alternative is implemented and weakly more messages. In any given equilibrium, decreasing the own-project bias of one agent improves the precision of communication by both agents. Finally, sequential communication and simple delegation are shown to be essentially outcome-equivalent to simultaneous communication. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 89
页数:25
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