机构:
Univ Virginia, Law, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USAUniv Virginia, Law, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA
Gilbert, Michael D.
[1
]
Guim, Mauricio
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Inst Tecnol Autonomo Mexico, Div Social Sci & Law, Mexico City, DF, MexicoUniv Virginia, Law, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA
Guim, Mauricio
[2
]
Weisbuch, Michael
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Virginia, Sch Law, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
US Dist Court Northern Dist Calif, San Francisco, CA USAUniv Virginia, Law, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA
Weisbuch, Michael
[3
,4
]
机构:
[1] Univ Virginia, Law, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA
[2] Inst Tecnol Autonomo Mexico, Div Social Sci & Law, Mexico City, DF, Mexico
[3] Univ Virginia, Sch Law, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[4] US Dist Court Northern Dist Calif, San Francisco, CA USA
来源:
ICON-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
|
2021年
/
19卷
/
03期
关键词:
DEMOCRACY;
RULES;
D O I:
10.1093/icon/moab062
中图分类号:
D9 [法律];
DF [法律];
学科分类号:
0301 ;
摘要:
Legal designers use different mechanisms to entrench constitutions. This article studies one mechanism that has received little attention: constitutional "locks," or forced waiting periods for amendments. We begin by presenting a global survey, which reveals that locks appear in sixty-seven national constitutions. They vary in length from nine days to six years, and they vary in reach, with some countries "locking" their entire constitution and others locking only select parts. After presenting the survey, we consider rationales for locks. Scholars tend to lump locks with other tools of entrenchment, such as bicameralism and supermajority rule, but we argue that locks have distinct and interesting features. Specifically, we theorize that locks can cool passions better than other entrenchment mechanisms, promote principled deliberation by placing lawmakers behind a veil of ignorance, and protect minority groups by creating space for political bargaining. Legislators cannot work around locks, and because locks are simple and transparent, lawmakers cannot "break" them without drawing attention. For these reasons, we theorize that locks facilitate constitutional credibility and self-enforcement, perhaps better than other entrenchment mechanisms.
机构:
MICHIGAN STATE UNIV, DEPT AGR ENGN, COOPERAT EXTENS SERV, E LANSING, MI 48823 USAMICHIGAN STATE UNIV, DEPT AGR ENGN, COOPERAT EXTENS SERV, E LANSING, MI 48823 USA