The Stable Roommates Problem with Short Lists

被引:0
|
作者
Cseh, Agnes [1 ]
Irving, Robert W. [2 ]
Manlove, David F. [2 ]
机构
[1] Reykjavik Univ, Sch Comp Sci, Reykjavik, Iceland
[2] Univ Glasgow, Sch Comp Sci, Glasgow, Lanark, Scotland
来源
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
EFFICIENT ALGORITHM; MARRIAGE; MATCHINGS; APPROXIMATION; STABILITY; HARD;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_17
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (SRI) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-SRI, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of SRI with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if d = 3. On the positive side we give a 2d+3/7-approximation algorithm for d is an element of {3, 4, 5} which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of SRI, called d-SRTI, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-SRTI admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the "most stable" version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time.
引用
收藏
页码:207 / 219
页数:13
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