In late 1964, due to the constant operations carried out by the Viet Cong, the US government faced major difficulties in dealing with the political situation in South Vietnam. President Lyndon Baynes Johnson opted for an effective show of strength, further evidencing his support for the South Vietnamese. The first resource used in the military assault were air raids, which provoked as much discussion as the delay in the deployment of ground troops. Between February and March 1965, President Johnson sent the first US military contingents to South Vietnam and launched a major bombing campaign against North Vietnam called "Rolling Thunder" initiating the country's official involvement in the war. In general terms, the air strikes failed to achieve their goals as they did not stop the flow of fighters and supplies to the Viet Cong. This article is aimed to recall how the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam managed to respond to US military aviation using Russian and Chinese aircraft and taking full advantage of their equipment and skilled pilots, as well as how the country overcame adversity, its own limitations and the immense US air power between 1965 and 1968. The major side effects of the air offensive against North Vietnam and their capitalization by the North Vietnamese as negative war propaganda will also be observed. To this end, the focus was put on the new field of Military History and the History of International Affairs. Available sources from the Presidential Library's online collections, Lyndon Baynes Johnson, the Cold War International History Project at the Wilson Center, the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States, the online archive of the French newspaper Le Monde and the US newspaper Chicago Tribune were additionally consulted. At the end of the present article, the works of Boniface (2015), Davies (2008), McNamara (1995), Mo??se (1996), Morrocco (1984), Toperczer (2001), Van Staaveren (2002) are cited as bibliographic support.