Reassessing the Marine Corps' Approach to Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968

Scholars of the Vietnam War contend that the U.S. had two distinct strategic options for fighting the war: attrition and pacification. While the overall American commander, General William Westmoreland, embraced attrition through search-and-destroy, the Marine Corps favored pacification. Critics of Westmoreland have contended that pacification, which entailed protecting the South Vietnamese and winning over their hearts-and-minds, was a better approach that could have brought about a successful outcome to the war. The recent declassification of Marine Corps records requires us to reappraise what pacification actually involved however. These records demonstrate that the Marine Corps believed a successful pacification strategy in Vietnam demanded a substantial expansion of the war into North Vietnam and bordering states and a multi-decade commitment of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the Marine Corps approach did not differ substantially from Westmoreland's and was no more likely a means of achieving victory within the limitations stipulated by the Johnson Administration.