The Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining

Objectives Previous research on ultimatum bargaining suggests a central role of emotion. More specifically, it is posited that proposers are motivated by fear to make fair offers and that responders are motivated by anger to reject unfair offers. Based on this research, several studies have examined the effect of a responder's anger in both the responder and proposer. Our objective is to examine these effects and the factors that influence them. Methods Here, we review these studies investigating the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger in ultimatum bargaining. Results Intrapersonal anger increases responders' rejection rates. As in the broader literature on negotiation, the literature shows mixed effects of interpersonal anger in ultimatum bargaining. Studies have demonstrated that these effects might be influenced in part by the credibility of the responder's anger and/or the relative power of the proposer. Results suggest that interpersonal anger is more effective when it is credible and when the responder is of a relatively high power position. Conclusions Taken together, these studies suggest a clear effect of intrapersonal anger and mixed results regarding the interpersonal effects of anger. Those mixed results found within the extant literature might be explained, in part, by credibility and power. It is also suggested that other factors (i.e. threat potential and race) may also play a role in the effectiveness of interpersonal anger.