Elite collective agency and the state

被引:2
|
作者
Erturk, Korkut Alp [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utah, Dept Econ, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
关键词
Elites; collective agency; state power; coordination; credible threats; subgame imperfect equilibrium; POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS; DEMOCRACY; CONFLICT; PROPERTY; VIOLENCE; POWER;
D O I
10.1017/S1744137419000389
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination.. The challenge for elites is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst..The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can control. The elites can coordinate by being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest, which by reducing the cost of carrying them out make them more credible. On the other hand, their coordinated non-compliance has the opposite effect...
引用
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页码:13 / 24
页数:12
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